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Abstract 
Over the last two decades, several European nations have introduced reforms to their 
electricity sector. Generally, these reforms require a legal and functional unbundling of vertically 
integrated companies. These unbundling processes may reduce the possibilities that exist to fruit-
fully exploit the advantages of vertical integration.  
The goal of this paper is to empirically analyze the presence of economies of scale and 
vertical integration in the Swiss electricity sector. Economies of vertical integration between elec-
tricity production and distribution result from reduced transaction costs, better coordination of 
highly specific and interdependent investments and less financial risk. Different econometric 
specifications for panel data, including a random effects and a random-coefficients model, have 
been used to estimate a quadratic multi-stage cost function for a sample of electricity companies. 
The empirical results reflect the presence of considerable economies of vertical integration and 
economies of scale for most of the companies considered in the analysis. Moreover, the results 
suggest a variation in economies of vertical integration across companies due to unobserved het-
erogeneity.  
JEL Classification: C33, D24, L11, L25, L94, L95
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Introduction 
Several European countries have embraced new and modern reforms to their electricity 
sector over the past two decades. The general principles adopted in these reforms included the 
introduction of competition in electricity generation and the introduction of new regulatory in-
struments such as the price cap method in the transmission and distribution of electricity, still 
considered natural monopolies.  
These reforms have introduced some changes to the managerial organization of electric 
utilities, traditionally maintained as vertically integrated utilities with generation, transmission 
and distribution under a common corporate roof. For instance, the directive 2003/54/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the EU Council of 26 June 2003 requires a legal and functional un-
bundling of the utilities.2 Generally, the vertically integrated companies are required to separate 
the production, transmission and distribution functions.  
The thesis behind this policy is that unbundling the services into separate functions al-
lows greater efficiency through stronger and more transparent competition in the generation and 
sale activities of this sector. Not only does unbundling reduce the possibilities of cross-
subsidizing generation activities with transmission activities, it also curtails the possibility of lim-
iting the access to the network for competing generators.  
However, one has to consider that unbundling processes reduce the possibilities that ex-
ist to exploit the advantages of vertical integration. In fact, a vertically integrated structure can be 
cost effective if there is a substantial need for coordination across stages and if high transaction 
costs are associated with using intermediary markets. This means that policymakers should be 
concerned about the efficient balance between integration and unbundling. 3 According to the EU 
policy directive, EU member states can exempt utilities with fewer than 100,000 customers from 
any functional unbundling requirement of the distribution network. In this case, the EU seems to 
                                                 
2 The EU distinguishes five main types of such unbundling: 1. Accounting unbundling; 2. Functional unbundling 
(separate accounts and management for transmission and generation activities); 3. Legal unbundling (transmission 
and generation are separate legal entities); 4. Ownership unbundling (generation and transmission have to be owned 
by independent entities). 
3 The welfare implications of this policy results from the magnitude of the price savings associated with the introduc-
tion of competition and the cost increases caused by a reduction of the exploitation of vertical economies. Unfortu-
nately, no study at the European level has systematically analyzed these welfare implications. 
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consider that for relatively small electric utilities the economies of vertical integration are consid-
erable. 
Economies of vertical integration between electricity production and distribution result 
from reduced transaction costs; better coordination of highly specific and interdependent invest-
ments in generation, transmission and distribution; less financial risk due to higher certainty in 
the sale activities; and avoiding the hold-up problem from technological interdependencies in dif-
ferent production stages. 4 A reduction in transaction costs implies a drop in the coordination 
costs for daily activities in the coordination costs of planning a reliable, and least-cost production 
and transmission system, and a cut in the negotiation costs. 5 
Despite its policy importance, only a few studies have estimated directly the economies 
of vertical integration in the electricity sector. Kaserman and Mayo (1991), Kwoka (2002), and 
Isaacs (2006) estimated a quadratic multi-stage cost function for a cross section of US electricity 
companies. Jara-Diaz, Martinez-Budria et al. (2004) estimated a quadratic multi-stage cost func-
tion for a sample of Spanish electricity companies using panel data, whereas Fraquelli, Piacenza 
et al. (2005) estimated a composite multi-stage cost function with a log-quadratic input price 
structure and a quadratic output structure using panel data for a sample of Italian utilities. Recent-
ly, Greer (2008) estimated a multi-stage, multi-output cost function for a cross section of US rural 
electric cooperatives. In general, all studies found that economies of vertical integration exist. 
Moreover, these studies indicate that larger utilities exploit a higher degree of economies of verti-
cal integration. 6  
The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to the empirical literature on the 
economies of vertical integration using panel data for a sample of Swiss electricity distribution 
utilities. This analysis has important policy implications in view of the ongoing electricity market 
reforms in Switzerland as well in several European countries, especially for discussion on the ex-
                                                 
4  The organization of the electricity industry in several production stages (generation, transmission and distribution) 
implies that generators need transmission and distribution to get electricity to consumers and that transmission and 
distribution assets need generators. In this situation, the generator, transmission and distribution assets, created and 
independently owned, cannot be dedicated to other uses. Therefore, either side can ‘hold up’ the other. 
5 For a detailed discussion on the sources of the economies of vertical integration in the electricity industry see Mi-
chaels (2004).  
6 Other methodologies to analyze if vertical effects exist are by separability test of cost functions (see Lee (1995) and 
Hayashi, Goo et al. - 1997) and by the estimation of cost complementarities (see Gilsdorf (1994), and Ida and Kuwa-
hara - 2004). However, these approached do not allow quantifying the effects.  
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emption limit for the functional unbundling requirement of three activities--generation, transmis-
sion and distribution.7   
From a methodological point of view, one of the major difficulties in estimating econo-
mies of vertical integration is that different networks, environmental and technical characteristics 
can typify vertically integrated and vertically disintegrated electricity companies. From the em-
pirical analysis point of view, many of these characteristics are not observed or are difficult to 
measure--and therefore, not included in the cost model specification. Such an omitted-variables 
problem could bias the estimation results. Moreover, the strong heterogeneity among utilities 
suggests that a cost function with constant coefficients might be inadequate for a reliable analysis 
of economies of vertical integration.  
In this study, to account at least partially for such heterogeneity and to perhaps assess 
the potential biases, we use some econometric specifications for panel data. To our knowledge, 
only the study by Jara-Diaz, Martinez-Budria et al. (2004) has used the advantages of panel data 
models to account for heterogeneity among companies. However, the approach used by these au-
thors, a fixed effects model, is able to only partially consider the effect of the unobserved hetero-
geneity on the coefficients of the econometric model.  
In this paper we estimate a multi-stage cost function using two panel data econometric 
models, a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model with random intercept and a random coeffi-
cients (RC) model. The data set comprises 74 Swiss electricity companies observed during the 
period between 1997 and 2005. The sample includes both specialized and integrated companies.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model specification and the esti-
mation methods; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 presents the regression results; the defi-
nition of economies of vertical integration and economies of scale and their estimates are dis-
cussed in Section 5; the paper ends with a summary of main results and policy conclusions.  
 
                                                 
7 Although Switzerland does not belong to the European Union, the Swiss electricity market reform has introduced 
some unbundling requirements. For instance, the large interregional high-voltage transmission network has been 
functionally unbundled. Moreover, the small and middle-sized electricity companies have introduced an accounting 
and informational unbundling. To note, that the Swiss reform does not foresee a formal exemption limit for the func-
tional unbundling of the different activities. However, because the majority of the Swiss companies have less than 
100’000 customers, implies indirectly an acceptance of the European limit.  
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1. Model specification  
Empirical studies on the cost structure of vertically integrated electricity utilities and of 
specialized utilities assume total cost as a function of output, price of inputs and some output 
characteristic variables such as area size, customer density and load factor. Generally, these out-
put characteristic variables are introduced in the model to capture heterogeneity in the output and 
in the different service areas. Most of these studies also include a time trend to control for poten-
tial changes in the technology.  
For the empirical analysis of this paper we considered a sample of small and middle-sized 
electricity companies. While some of them are vertically integrated companies, others are active 
only in the distribution of electricity. Vertically integrated companies are characterized by the 
presence of hydropower plants, a small high voltage transmission network, and a regional distri-
bution network.  
The model specification used in this study is based on a cost function with two outputs 
(electricity generation and distribution), two inputs, three output characteristic variables, and a 
linear time trend. As in Sing (1987), Kwoka (2002), Filippini, Hrovatin et al. (2004) and 
Fraquelli, Piacenza et al. (2005) customer density is introduced as a service area characteristic. 
Furthermore, the load factor of the network and the capacity utilization factor at the generation 
level are also included in the model to control differences in the load profiles across the compa-
nies.8  
Following Kwoka (2002), the share of the sales to end consumers has also been introduced 
in the cost model. In fact, distribution to end consumers needs more transformation and more in-
frastructures compared with distribution to resellers, and is therefore assumed to be related to 
higher losses and higher costs. We are aware that these output characteristics variables consider 
just one part of the heterogeneity of the electric companies included in this study. However, as 
we will see later, part of the unobserved characteristics variables will indirectly be taken into ac-
count using panel data econometric models.  
                                                 
8 See also studies by Gilsdorf (1995), Filippini (1996) and (1998), Yatchew (2000) and Filippini, Hrovatin et al. 
(2004) which included the load factor of the network and studies by Maloney (2001), Kwoka (2002), Ida and Kuwa-
hara (2004) and Jara-Diaz, Martinez-Budria et al. (2004) where the generation capacity utilization factor was in-
cluded.  
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If it is assumed that the firm minimizes cost and that the technology is convex, a total cost 
function can be written as:  
 
( 1, 2, , , , , , , )C C Q Q PC PL CD EC LF CU T=               (1) 
 
where C represents total costs; Q1 and Q2 are respectively the electricity generated and electric-
ity distributed during the year; PL and PC are respectively the input factor prices for labour and 
capital services9; CD is the customer density; EC is the share of the distributed electricity to end 
consumers; LF is the load factor of the network; and CU measures the generation capacity utiliza-
tion. Finally, T is a linear time trend controlling for technical change.  
For the estimation of the total cost (1), it is necessary to choose a functional form. With a 
growing number of functional forms available, the model builder’s task is getting complicated. A 
comparison of the different functional forms requires some a priori selection criteria which 
should refer to mathematical, econometric and economic properties. For the estimation of multi-
stage cost functions in the electricity sector, most of the studies have used a quadratic functional 
form. Recently, Fraquelli et al. (2004) used a general specification of the composite cost function 
model proposed by Pulley and Braunstein (1992). This is a non-linear functional form that nests 
the standard translog cost function, the generalized translog cost function, and the separable 
quadratic cost function.  
This means that from a mathematical point of view this functional form is more flexible. 
That is, it imposes lesser restrictions than the other classical functional forms. However, from the 
econometric point of view, this functional form can present some drawbacks. For instance, in the 
presence of panel data, the quadratic functional form can be easily estimated using several 
econometric specifications for panel data, whereas the estimation of the non-linear model of Pul-
                                                 
9 In a study by Jara-Diaz et. al. (2004) 4 input prices have been included in the cost model: capital, labor, fuel price, 
and a price for an intermediate input. In this model we decided to exclude the latter two input prices for the following 
reasons. The electricity companies included in our sample produce electricity using hydropower plants. For the use 
of water (“fuel”) these companies have to pay a fixed fee per kw to the local government. This water fee is the same 
for all companies (80 Swiss francs per kW). This implies that this variable cannot be included in the model. Further, 
it is not clear how to specify the price for the intermediary input because, as pointed out by Jara-Diaz et. al. (2004), 
the reference inputs behind this measure is highly heterogeneous. For this reasons we preferred to use a simpler 
specification. 
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ley and Braunstein (1992) is not straightforward.10 As we will discuss later, some econometric 
specifications for panel data have the advantage of reducing potential bias in empirical results 
due to unobserved heterogeneity.  
Given the potential importance of unobserved heterogeneity in the model and given the 
possibility to take it into account, we focus here on the quadratic functional form which was in-
troduced by Baumol, Panzar et al. (1982) and applied among others by Mayo (1984). This form is 
readily adaptable to panel data econometric models and has been considered as one of the most 
relevant options for estimating scope economies (Tovar, Jara-Diaz et al. - 2007).11 In addition, 
unlike logarithmic forms, the functional form accommodates zero values for outputs, thus allow-
ing an inclusion of specialized companies and a straightforward identification of economies of 
vertical integration.  
Although logarithmic functions could be used with an arbitrary small value transformation 
for zero values, it has been shown that this approach could result in large errors in the estimation 
of scope economies (Pulley and Humphrey - 1993). As in our case, many output values for elec-
tricity generation and distribution are zero. Such estimation errors may result in misleading con-
clusions about the economies of vertical integration. One disadvantage of the quadratic form is 
that the linear homogeneity of the cost function in input prices cannot be imposed by parametric 
restrictions without sacrificing the flexibility of the functional form (Caves, Christensen et al. - 
1980). However, the linear homogeneity in input prices can be imposed by normalization of 
prices namely, by dividing the costs and all factor prices by one common factor price12  
                                                 
10 For example, Fraquelli, Piacenza et al. (2004) analyze the economies of vertical integration for a sample of Italian 
companies using panel data and applying several non-linear functional forms. However, from the econometric point 
of view, panel data econometric models have not been used. In this case, the authors have given a legitimate impor-
tance to the flexibility dimension of the functional form. 
11 See Farsi, Fetz et al. (2008) for the use of the quadratic functional form with several panel data models. 
12 See Farsi, Fetz et al. - (2007), and Jara-Diaz, Martinez-Budria et al. - 2003.  
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The quadratic form is a flexible functional form with a second-order Taylor approximation 
of any arbitrary function around a local approximation point. In this paper the sample mean has 
been used as the approximation point following the commonly used approach in the literature 
(e.g. Jara-Diaz, Martinez-Budria et al. - 2003).13 The adopted normalized quadratic cost function 
specification can be written as follows:  
 
tTitCUitLFitBCitCD
itPLititQQitQQitQQitQitQit
TCULFBCCD
PLQQQQQQC
ααααα
ααααααα
+++++
++++++= 21
2
1)2(
2
1)1(
2
121 21
2
22
2
11210
              (2)
 
 
where subscripts i and t denote the company and year respectively.14 Normalized costs Cit, the 
normalized factor price PL, output characteristics CD, EC, LF and CU, and the time trend T are 
introduced in a linear way (following Mayo - 1984). Finally α0 is the intercept.15  
 
2. Data and econometric specification 
The unbalanced panel data set contains financial and technical information from 74 compa-
nies observed during the nine-year period between 1997 and 2005. Thirty six companies are inte-
grated with electricity distribution and hydropower generation, nine companies are only electric-
ity distributors, and 29 companies are hydropower generators.  
The data was collected from companies’ annual reports and from the Swiss Federal Office 
of Energy (BFE - 2007). With this data set, we cover 42% of total electricity distribution and 
40% of total hydropower generation in Switzerland.  
The variables for the cost function specification were constructed as follows. Total costs 
(C) are calculated as the total expenditures of the electricity generation and distribution firms in a 
                                                 
13 This normalization has been obtained by demeaning all the included explanatory variables (subtracting from their 
mean values). Therefore, the intercept captures the total costs of production at the sample mean.  
14 We excluded the equation system approach with factor share equations as this approach also cannot easily be es-
timated using panel data econometric models.  
15 An extension of the quadratic cost function is the flexible fixed cost quadratic cost function suggested by Mayo 
(1984) and Panzar (1989). However, our additional estimations of this function showed that the estimated intercepts 
are not significantly different from each other and we therefore favoured the simpler model with a single intercept.  
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given year, excluding expenditure for purchased electricity.16 The outputs are measured in Giga-
watt hours (GWh) by the total quantity generated and delivered to the customers.  
Input prices are defined as factor expenditures per factor unit. Labour price (PL) is defined 
as the ratio of annual labour costs to the total number of employees as full time equivalent. Fol-
lowing Friedlaender and Chiang (1983) and Farsi et. al. (2008), the capital price (PC) is calcu-
lated as residual cost (where residual cost is total cost minus labour costs) divided by the capital 
stock, which is approximated here with the installed capacity of the generation assets and the 
maximal load of the network.17 The customer density (CD) is measured by the number of cus-
tomers divided by the network length measured in kilometres; (EC), the share of the distributed 
electricity to end consumers is given as the percentage of sales to end consumers on total sales. 
The load factor (LF) of the network is defined as the ratio of average and the maximum distribu-
tion per hour and the capacity utilization (CU) is measured by the ratio of the average hourly 
generation per year and the installed generation capacity. 
                                                 
16 See also Gilsdorf (1994) and (1995), Kwoka (2002), Jara-Diaz, Martinez-Budria et al. (2003), Filippini, Hrovatin 
et al. (2004), Jara-Diaz, Martinez-Budria et al. (2004) and Fraquelli, Piacenza et al. (2005) for defining the total costs 
as a net measure. Another approach was introduced by Kaserman and Mayo (1991) by using a total cost function 
including electricity purchases. However, this approach due to a double counting problem requires a modification of 
the definition of economies of vertical integration, that is not satisfactory.  
17 Due to a lack of data it was not possible to calculate the value of the assets by the perpetual inventory method. 
Other possibilities of a proxy for the capital stock is first the asset value from the annual reports of the companies, 
second the sum of installed generation capacity and the capacity of the transformers weighted by the specific invest-
ment costs and third the sum of the distributed and generated electricity (see Fraquelli, Piacenza et al. (2005)). How-
ever, the first suffers from different depreciation behaviors of the companies, the second from the lack of data and 
the third from the correlation with the output.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (570 observations) 
Variable Unit Mini-
mum 
Median Mean Maximum 
C Total cost without 
electricity purchases 
CHF 372’755 17.7x106 42.0x106 334x106 
Q1 Electricity genera-
tion 
GWh 0 66.4 206 1’790 
Q2 Electricity distribu-
tion 
GWh 0 50.2 624 10’346 
PL Labour price CHF/employee 58’483 107’363 105’710 181’419 
PC Capital price CHF/MW 48’044 214’762 254’319 837’655 
CD Customer density Customers/km 0 14.8 20.6 174.9 
EC Share of distribution 
to end consumers 
% 0 0.55 0.48 1 
LF Load factor of the 
network 
% 0 0.42 0.33 0.80 
CU Generation capacity 
utilization 
% 0 0.41 0.40 0.91 
 
Table 1 provides the sample’s descriptive statistics. All the costs and prices are adjusted for 
inflation using consumer price index and are measured in year 2000 Swiss Francs (CHF). As can 
be seen in the table, the sample shows a considerable difference in most of the variables.  
With regard to the choice of econometric technique, it should be noted that in econometric 
literature we can find various types of panel data models focusing on cross-sectional variation, 
that is, heterogeneity across units. The two most widely used approaches are the fixed-effects 
model and the random effects model.18 Another econometric approach for panel data that is inter-
esting in the presence of firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity is the RC model. In this model 
                                                 
18 For a detailed presentation of the econometric methods that have been used to analyse panel data, see Greene 
(2003) and Baltagi (1995).  
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the intercept and some or all explanatory variables are assumed to be random variables with a 
normal distribution across companies.  
For the estimation of the quadratic cost function (2) we decided to use the random effects 
GLS model and the RC model.19 We excluded the fixed-effects approach for the following rea-
sons.  
• The data shows a relatively low within discrepancy (variation over time) in some of the 
variables, especially the outputs, customer density, and the load factor. As Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005) pointed out, the fixed-effects approach has an important weakness in that 
the coefficients of explanatory variables are ‘very imprecise’ if the variables’ variation 
over time is dominated by that across companies (between variation).20  
• As suggested by Hsiao (2003), the random effects is a better candidate for unconditional 
(population-averaged) analysis.21 As the estimation of economies of vertical integration 
relies on out-of-sample predictions of costs with some zero outputs, we have favoured the 
random effects framework over the fixed effects specification. 
 
We are aware that in the random effects model, the individual effects might be correlated 
with explanatory variables, in which case the estimations might be affected by ‘heterogeneity 
bias’. In order to overcome this potential problem at least partially, we decided to also use a RC 
model. The variation of the coefficients of this specification should capture part of the correlation 
of the random intercept with the corresponding variables. In the RC model the two output coeffi-
cients and the intercept are assumed to be random variables with normal distribution across com-
panies. The RC model has been estimated using a simulated maximum likelihood method.  
 
                                                 
19 The result of a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test showed that individual effects exist and therefore no 
pooled OLS model should be used. 
20 Johnston and DiNardo (1997) also show that the ‘attenuation’ bias due to measurement errors is exacerbated in the 
fixed-effects models depending on the fraction of the within variation due to ‘mismeasurement’ especially when the 
explanatory variables are correlated across time. In our case both reporting errors and correlation across time are 
plausible. 
21 See also Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Verbeek (2004) for a discussion of this issue. 
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3. Results 
The estimation results obtained from the GLS model and the RC model are given in Table 
2. For the RC model, estimated with the simulated likelihood method using pseudo-random Hal-
ton draws, it is assumed that the intercept and the first-order coefficients of output vary across 
companies. 22  
The results reported in Table 2 show that generally the coefficients reported for both mod-
els have the expected sign and are significant and similar in magnitude. For instance, the output 
and input price coefficients are highly significant and have the expected positive sign. The effect 
of customer density (coefficient αCD) is negative, showing that an increase in the customer den-
sity decreases costs. The coefficient of the share of sales to end consumers (αEC) is, as expected, 
positive in all models. The load factor of the network αLF and the capacity utilization factor αCU 
are negative, suggesting that a higher peak load profile leads ceteris paribus to higher costs. Fi-
nally, in the GLS model the coefficient of the linear time trend suggests a cost decrease in the 
electricity sector over the observed period, whereas in the RC model this coefficient is not statis-
tically significant. 
 
                                                 
22 The number of draws has been fixed to 1000. The model was also estimated with several numbers of draws be-
tween 100 and 1,000. The results indicate that after 500 draws, the estimations become stable.  
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Table 2: Regression results 
 Normalized quadratic cost function
(RE GLS model) 
Normalized quadratic cost function 
(Random coefficient model) 
 Coefficient  z-statistics Coefficient z-statistics 
αQ1  0.23* (1.93) 0.51*** (74.62) 
αQ2   0.42*** (14.54) 0.39*** (14.99) 
αQ1Q1 0.00033* (1.84) -51.30x10-6*** (-12.84) 
αQ2Q2 -0.00006*** (-10.52) -97.02x10-6 (-1.33) 
αQ1Q2 -0.00004* (-1.68) -55.71x10-6*** (-5.23) 
αPL 52.99*** (8.18) 50.11*** (19.68) 
αPC -  -  
αCD -1.86** (-2.27) -2.80*** (-19.82) 
αEC 236*** (2.64) 511*** (23.64) 
αLF -218 (-1.62) -471.71*** (-13.15) 
αCU -124* (-1.90) -109.27*** (-7.09) 
αT -4.81*** (-2.91) -3.62*** (-2.92) 
α0 418*** (15.05) 530.46*** (130.85) 
ˆ uσ  204.99  -  
ˆ εσ  78.98  -  
 Overall R2 0.80 
McFadden 
pseudo R2
 0.24 
Standard deviation (SD) for random parameters (a) 
α0 -  115.08*** (39.88) 
αQ1 -  0.15*** (51.83) 
αQ2 -  1.41*** (52.71) 
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.  
The coefficient reported for each random parameter is the mean;  
(a) we report estimates of SD of normal distribution of random parameters. 
Furthermore, the estimated standard deviations of the RC are all statistically significant for 
the two outputs as well as for the intercept. This suggests that there is a significant variation in 
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the output coefficients and the intercept across companies. The estimates of the variances of the 
random effects show that there is a considerable unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.  
The estimation results presented in Table 2 can be used to compute the estimated values of 
the economies of vertical integration and (product-specific) economies of scale. These results, 
along with a formal description of the concepts, will be presented in the following section. 
 
4. Economies of vertical integration and economies of scale 
Following Baumol, Panzar et al. (1982) the global economies of scale (ES) in a multi-
output setting are defined as: 
 
( 1, 2)
1* 2 *
1 2
C Q QES C CQ Q
Q Q
= ∂ ∂+∂ ∂
                 (3) 
 
where C(Q1, Q2) is the total cost of producing Q1 and Q2, ∂C/∂Q1 is the marginal cost of pro-
ducing product Q1, ∂C/∂Q2 is the marginal cost of producing product Q2.  
Global economies of scale describe the cost behaviour caused by proportional changes in 
the entire production. Economies of scale prevail if ES is greater than 1 and, accordingly, dis-
economies of scale exist if ES is below 1. In the case of ES = 1 no economies or diseconomies of 
scale exist.  
In addition, product-specific economies of scale are based on changes of one output or an 
output pair, while all other outputs are held constant. Product-specific economies of scale to the 
product m are defined as (see Baumol, Panzar et al. (1982)): 
( 1, 2) ( )
*
m
m
m
m
C Q Q C QSL CQ
Q
−−= ∂
∂
,              (4) 
where ( 1, 2) ( )mC Q Q C Q−−  represents the incremental cost resulting from producing output m and 
( )mC Q−  is the costs of producing all the outputs jointly except output m. 
Economies of vertical integration (EVI) are present when costs can be reduced by joint 
production of multiple outputs across different production stages. Following the Baumol, Panzar 
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et al. (1982) concept of economies of scope, the degree of EVI across two stages can be defined 
as the ratio of excess costs of separate production to the costs of joint production in one company:  
 
( 1, 0) (0, 2) ( 1, 2)
( 1, 2)
C Q C Q C Q QEVI
C Q Q
+ −=                (5) 
 
where C(Q1, 0) is the total cost when output for product Q2 is zero. Similarly, C (0, Q2) is the 
total cost when output for product Q1 is zero. A positive (negative) value for the above 
expression implies the existence of economies (diseconomies) of vertical integration.  
Using Equations (3) and (5), and the regression results, the values of EVI and scale 
economies have been estimated for all companies. It is important to underline that a correct 
estimation of EVI relies on adequate prediction of costs at certain points that are at the sample 
boundary or completely out of the sample. The precision of such predictions depends on the 
econometric specification. As discussed earlier, a GLS model provides a relatively accurate out-
of-sample prediction. The random-coefficient model has an additional advantage with respect to 
heterogeneity bias in the coefficients.  
Table 3 provides a descriptive summary of the distribution of the estimates of the EVI and 
scale across the companies included in the sample. The results obtained from both GLS and RC 
models are listed. In both models, the firm-specific random effects are included in the calculation 
of economies of scale and vertical integration.23 Moreover, for the computation of the economies 
of scale and vertical integration, the input prices and output characteristics are considered at their 
individual level.  
Both GLS and RC estimates suggest the existence of economies of vertical integration and 
scale economies across a major part of the sample. Looking across the numbers from both models 
indicates that the majority of the companies exhibit economies of vertical integration and 
economies of scale. It has to be considered that the majority of companies considered in the 
                                                 
23 With respect to other studies, in this paper we consider in the computation of the values of the economies of ver-
tical integration and economics of scale the estimates of firm-specific individual effects, namely the conditional ex-
pectation of the random intercept and random coefficients. Of course, we are aware that such company-level esti-
mates may entail relatively large estimation errors at the individual level. However, we believe that this approach 
based on actual levels of outputs, network characteristics and individual unobserved heterogeneity reflects in a better 
way the characteristics of the production technology rather than an approach that calculates the values of the econo-
mies of vertical integration using some values for a series of hypothetical companies.   
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empirical analysis have less than 100,000 customers. This implies that these results apply mainly 
for small and middle-sized companies. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of economies of vertical integration and economies of scale estimated for 
individual companies (normalized quadratic cost function) 
 Economies of vertical integration Economies of scale 
 RE GLS RC RE GLS RC 
20th percentile 0.30 0.13 0.98 0.94 
40th percentile 0.64 0.40 1.40 1.23 
60th percentile 0.74 0.59 2.05 1.53 
80th percentile 1.06 1.13 3.21 2.21 
 
A comparison of the results of the GLS model and the RC model in the 3 also shows that 
the RC model provides a lower estimate of both economies, as seen in slightly lower values for 
most of the percentiles. This could be explained by the fact that the RC model gives a relatively 
lower weight to differences regarding fixed costs because part of these costs might be captured by 
random coefficients. However, we could not find any conclusive pattern suggesting a one-sided 
bias because of ignoring such unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Table 4 shows the product-specific economies of scale of the RE GLS model and the RC model. 
These results confirm the presence of product-specific economies of scale. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of the product-specific economies of scale estimated for individual compa-
nies (normalized quadratic cost function) 
 Generation Distribution 
 RE GLS RC RE GLS RC 
20th percentile 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 
40th percentile 0.86 1.00 1.01 1.01 
60th percentile 0.94 1.02 1.03 1.01 
80th percentile 0.99 1.06 1.12 1.10 
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5. Conclusions 
Using a panel data set from Swiss electricity companies operating in the distribution and 
generation stage, this paper has studied the economies of vertical integration and economies of 
scale. For this purpose, a quadratic multi-stage cost function has been estimated using two 
econometric specifications for panel data - a random effects panel data (GLS) model and a ran-
dom-coefficient (RC) model. These models have been chosen to consider the effect of unob-
served heterogeneity across different electricity distributors and generators on the values of the 
economies of scale and economies of vertical integration.  
While the GLS model considers unobserved heterogeneity as various costs shift across 
companies, the RC model includes variations in the coefficients of the outputs. Compared to a 
simple pooled model, the GLS specification provides a better control for omitted variables. The 
RC model provides an additional improvement regarding the potential heterogeneity bias in the 
coefficients’ estimates.  
The empirical results confirm the existence of significant economies of vertical integration 
and economies of scale for a majority of the electricity companies considered in the sample. This 
suggests that additional costs could result from unbundling vertically integrated companies. Fur-
ther, the values of the economies of scale and of vertical integration show a considerable varia-
tion among individual companies. This variation is due partially by the difference among compa-
nies in the values of the observed heterogeneity and partially by the difference of the coefficients 
capturing the unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, this result underlines the importance of consider-
ing unobserved network and environmental characteristics in the econometric specification.  
From the policy point of view, these empirical results support the EU policy directive that 
provides member states the possibility to exempt companies with fewer than 100,000 customers 
from any functional unbundling requirement. Moreover, this result supports the decision taken by 
the Swiss Government to not force the introduction of a functional unbundling for the small and 
middle sized Swiss vertical integrated companies.  
Finally, the analysis reported in this paper suggests that unbundling processes reduce the 
possibilities to exploit the advantages of vertical integration. This means that policymakers 
should be generally more concerned about the efficient balance between integration and unbun-
dling, also for larger companies for which no empirical evidence is available. 
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